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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
an attorney’s later failure to identify an earlier error, leading to a loss
of an opportunity to mitigate damages caused by the initial error,
could constitute a separate instance of legal malpractice triggering its
own limitations period.1 In W a lle ric h, the court declined to dismiss an
action based on damages incurred in a divorce proceeding. The
damages were principally caused by a negligently drafted antenuptial
agreement which was later incorporated into a separate legal
document (a will).2 Instead of following Minnesota’s bright-line rule
(that damages flowing from a negligently drafted antenuptial
agreement accrue on the date of the marriage), the court allowed the
plaintiff to allege that the later negligent act—the attorney’s failure to
verify the validity of the antenuptial agreement—caused additional
damages, thus constituting a wholly separate claim.3 In doing so, the
court introduced a multi-factor framework, including factors that
helped the court isolate the two claims.4
This case note argues that the multi-factor framework
complicates, rather than clarifies the law. Further, this case note
recommends that the analysis should focus on whether the plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged a separate breach and separate cause of
damages. If the plaintiff can state a claim separate from a claim that is
barred by a statute of limitations, then his or her claim should survive
1.
2.
3.
4.

907 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Minn. 2018).
Id .
Id .at 179.
Id .at 176.
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a motion to dismiss. This note also highlights key features of the
holding that may increase transactional attorneys’ overall exposure to
malpractice claims. Additionally, the analysis explores a “separate
duty” or “scope of representation” approach and the probable effect
of a “Frederick Letter” disclaiming particular tasks. Finally, this note
offers guidance for transactional attorneys seeking to avoid
malpractice lawsuits.
II. HISTORY
A. N e g lig e nc e a nd Le g a lM a lpra c tic e :The Ele m e nts
To assert a claim for negligence, the plaintiff generally must show
that the defendant acted negligently and that the defendant’s
negligence caused the plaintiff harm.5 When a professional, such as an
attorney, doctor, or architect, performs a service negligently, resulting
in harm to their client, the professional commits malpractice.6 Under
Minnesota law, attorneys are liable for legal malpractice when they
perform legal services below the level of skill or diligence of a
reasonable attorney.7 To assert a claim for legal malpractice, the
plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship, (2) negligence by the attorney,8 (3) that the negligence
was the proximate cause of the client’s damages, and (4) that but for
the attorney’s negligence, the client would have obtained a more
favorable outcome in the litigation or transaction than the outcome
actually obtained.9
5. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 124
Elements of the Prima Facie Case for Negligence (2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter DOBBS].
6. MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, CIVJIG 80.55 Duty ofa n Attorne y, 4A
MINN. PRAC., JURY INSTR. GUIDES—CIVIL (6th ed. 2017) [hereinafter STEENSON].
7. Se e ,e .g ., Jerry’s Enters., Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, 711 N.W.2d
811, 816 (Minn. 2006); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288,
293–94 (1970).
8. A plaintiff may also allege breach of contract. Se e ,e .g ., Ronnigen v. Hertogs,
294 Minn. 7, 199 N.W.2d 420 (1972); Christy, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288. But the
analysis is similar to a claim for negligence. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,
291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980).
9. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 173 (citing Je rry’s Ente rs., 711 N.W.2d at 819
(holding that while the fourth element normally turns on whether the plaintiff would
have been successful in the prosecution or defense of a legal action, this element must
be altered in a transactional context)).

1048

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:3

1. Duty:The Attorne y-Clie ntRe la tionship
The distinguishing factor between legal malpractice and a typical
negligence claim is the first element: the attorney-client relationship.
In tort law, all people, regardless of their relationship, owe a duty of
reasonable care to avoid causing physical or emotional harm to
another.10 The damage in legal malpractice, however, is typically
economic loss, rather than physical or emotional harm.11 When the
damage alleged is economic loss, most states require a “special
relationship” between the parties whereby the plaintiff relied on the
defendant, and the defendant was responsible for some economic
outcome for the plaintiff.12 This special relationship triggers a duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff that the defendant would not
otherwise owe.13 The attorney-client relationship is one of these
relationships.14 Thus, an attorney’s duty to his or her client arises out
of this special relationship, and without such a relationship, the
attorney may not be held liable.
Most attorney-client relationships are formed through express
written agreements called “retainer agreements” or “engagement
letters.”15 These letters typically state the following: (1) that an
attorney-client relationship exists; (2) who the parties are; (3) what
each party has agreed to do; and (4) the scope of those duties.16 The
existence and widespread use of engagement letters does not imply,

10. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 124.
11. Id .§ 606.
12. Id .Note that this is only true for claims of negligence. No special relationship
is required if intent or malice is present. Id .
13. Id .§ 719 (“[W]ithout a client-lawyer relationship, there is rarely a duty, and
without a duty, there can be no malpractice liability.”).
14. Id .Other examples include accountants, insurance brokers, and notaries. Id .
§ 653.
15. Id .§ 719.
16. LAWYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ATTORNEYCLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT: RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICE GUIDE OF LAWYERS MUTUAL, 2–3
(2017), https://nmcdn.io/e186d21f8c7946a19faed23c3da2f0da/556712d9bf0f4cb
2a916cc810687d52b/files/risk-management-resources/risk-managementhandouts/attorney-client-agreements-toolkit/Agreements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M6D3-9H3C] [hereinafter ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT].
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however, that if there is no letter, there is no relationship.17 To the
contrary, an attorney-client relationship may also be implied.18
a . Tog sta d
Tog sta d v.Ve se ly, a landmark Minnesota Supreme Court decision
that focused on the “duty” element of legal malpractice, still defines
the attorney-client relationship in Minnesota today.19 In Tog sta d , the
plaintiff’s husband was rendered mute and partially paralyzed after
being treated by a doctor for an aneurysm.20 The plaintiff met with an
attorney to see if she had a case against the doctor for medical
malpractice.21 The attorney told Ms. Togstad that “he did not think
[the Togstads] had a legal case, however, he was going to discuss this
with his partner.”22 Ms. Togstad did not sign an agreement or pay a fee
for the consultation.23 When Ms. Togstad never heard back from the
attorney, she assumed she did not have a case.24 As a result, by the
time Ms. Togstad sought a second opinion from another lawyer, she
had missed the opportunity to bring the claim because the statute of
limitations had run.25
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Ms. Togstad and the
attorney had formed an attorney-client relationship during the
consultation because she sought, and the attorney gave, legal advice.26
According to the court, this was true regardless of any written
agreement, fee, or perhaps most importantly, whether the attorney
considered Ms. Togstad to be his client.27

17. Se e Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980); Ryan v. Long, 35
Minn. 394, 394, 29 N.W. 51, 51 (1886).
18. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719; se e a lso Tog sta d , 291 N.W.2d at 693; Rya n, 35
Minn. at 394, 29 N.W. at 51.
19. Se e Tog sta d , 291 N.W.2d at 693–94.
20. Id .at 689.
21. Id .at 690.
22. Id .
23. Id .
24. Id .
25. Id .
26. Id .at 693.
27. Id .
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b . The Non-Eng a g e m e ntLe tte r
Tog sta d was a controversial case. The decision was met with
apprehension from members of the legal community, who viewed its
implications as burdensome and difficult to navigate.28 One
commentator worried about being held liable for “curbstone
opinions,”29 or “casual and offhand opinion[s] on a point of law [made]
to a friend whom he meets on the street.”30 Another commentator
characterized the expanded liability as an “ax hanging over
[attorneys’] heads,” which would prevent attorneys from serving the
public prudently and would raise the cost of legal services overall.31
Yet another characterized the court’s ruling as prohibiting attorneys
from ever rejecting a case on its merits unless the attorney takes the
time to carefully consider the facts and research the relevant law.32
An attorney may decide against taking on a client for reasons
other than the merits of the client’s case, such as not practicing in the
relevant area of law, having a big workload, an ethical conflict of
interest associated with representing the client, or simply not wanting
to be involved.33 In these situations, no careful consideration or legal
research is required, as long as the attorney does not render any legal
advice to the nonclient.34 But if a visitor to a law office is sent home
and misinterprets the reason why he is not a client, the attorney who

28. Se e Michael J. Hoover, Legal Malpractice in Light of Togstad—Liability for
Curbstone Opinions?, Bench & B. Minn. (Nov. 1980), http://lprb.mncourts.gov/articl
es/ArticleImages/General%20Practice%20-%20Legal%20Malpractice%20in%20Li
ght%20of%20Togstad%20-%20Liability%20for%20Curbstone%20Opinions_Image
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JAV-NS75].
29. Id .
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (alteration
in original).
31. Hoover,supra note 28 (footnote omitted).
32. Se e id .(footnote omitted). In Tog sta d , this would have included, at a
minimum, obtaining medical records and consulting experts in the medical field. Se e
Tog sta d v.Ve se ly, 291 N.W.2d 686, 691–92 (Minn. 1980).
33. Se e ,e .g ., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (exceptions include court appointment for indigent criminal defendants,
representation that would violate ethical rules such as assisting a client with illegal
activity, and refusal to represent a client for discriminatory reasons).
34. Se e Tog sta d , 291 N.W.2d at 693.
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interviewed him may be liable for resulting damages.35 Any
discrepancy is likely to be resolved in the client’s favor.36
Tog sta d made it clear that the best practice for attorneys is to
leave nothing to interpretation when it comes to who is, and who is
not, a client.37 Furthermore, this distinction should be in writing, in
the form of a letter, in case the issue ever comes before the court.38 To
cover all bases, the communication should also suggest that the nonclient seek another attorney and that the statute of limitations may
bar their claim if they wait too long.39 Letters of this nature are called
“non-engagement letters,” often colloquially referred to as “Togstad
Letters.”40 Togstad Letters are currently widely used by many law

35. Id .
36. ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 10; Cf.RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 33, § 18(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“A
tribunal should construe a contract between client and lawyer as a reasonable person
in the circumstances of the client would have construed it.”); Id .§ 31 cmt. h (“[T]he
client’s reasonable understanding of the scope of the representation controls.”).
37. ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 11 (discussing the
value of non-engagement letters); The Tw oKe yLe tte rsYou Should Be Writing to Your
Clients, A.B.A. (June 27, 2017) https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publi
cations/youraba/2017/may-2017/the-two-key-letters-you-should-be-writing-toyour-clients-/ [https://perma.cc/7VXJ-UTDL] (endorsing engagement and nonengagement letters) [hereinafter A.B.A.].
38. Attorney-Client Agreements Toolkit, supra note 16, at 10–11; Hoover, supra
note 28.
39. See Attorney-Client Agreements Toolkit, supra note 16, at 10 (“Without
written evidence of non-representation, courts typically rule in favor of the
prospective client . . . .”).
40. Se e , e .g ., Aaron Hall, La w ye r Non-Eng a g e m e nt Tog sta d Le tte r Te m pla te :
De c lining Re pre se nta tion, ATTORNEY AARON HALL, https://aaronhall.com/lawyer-nonengagement-togstad-letter-template-declining-representation/
[https://perma.cc/89DP-NMEU]:
LEGAL NOTICE. Under state law, we are required to tell you that there are
statutes of limitation and legal deadlines for your situation. Failure to act
within these times can result in a waiver of your rights. We have made no
representations to you regarding these deadlines. Accordingly, you
should seek legal advice as soon as possible should you wish to pursue
this matter further.
Id .
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firms,41 and are strongly recommended by legal insurance providers42
and the American Bar Association.43 These letters serve to prevent
misunderstandings and protect attorneys from costly lawsuits.44
2. Ge tting tothe Jury
Whether an attorney-client relationship exists is a question of
duty—where there is no “client-lawyer relationship, there is rarely a
duty, and without a duty, there can be no malpractice liability.”45 The
question of whether the attorney owed the client a duty is generally a
question of law for the court.46 This means that, save for cases where
the court asks a jury to examine duty at trial,47 failure to prove this
element may result in dismissal at the earliest possible stage—the
pleading stage—foreclosing trial, and therefore, recovery.48
Additionally, while a plaintiff need not prove the other elements
of their cause of action, the plaintiff still must allege sufficient facts to
support those elements.49 The state of Minnesota generally observes
a liberal pleading standard50 whereby a plaintiff may allege minimal
facts at the outset of the lawsuit.51 Dismissal because the plaintiff
failed to state a claim is only granted to the defendant if, taking the

41. Se e id .(“A standard practice for law firms and attorneys in Minnesota is
sending a Non-Engagement Letter (i.e. Togstad Letter) to everyone who contacts the
firm or lawyer but does not hire the firm or lawyer.”).
42. ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 10–11 (stating the
non-engagement letter “should be a principle part of the client-intake process[]”
because of the potential for a malpractice liability claim).
43. Se e A.B.A., supra note 37.
44. ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 10–11.
45. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719.
46. Id .
47. Se e id .(noting that some courts task juries with resolving factual disputes
on whether a duty exists).
48. Se e MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.03; se e a lsoMINN. R. CIV. P. 56.
49. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). (“The factual
allegations must be minimally sufficient to show a plausible entitlement to relief so
that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests . . . .”) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
50. Se e , e .g ., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, 851 N.W.2d 598, 604–05 (Minn. 2014)
(interpreting MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01, 8.05); First Nat’l Bank of Henning v. Olson, 246
Minn. 28, 28–29, 74 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1955) (interpreting MINN. R. CIV. P. § 8.01).
51. Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 742–43 (Minn. 2003); MINN. R. CIV. P.
12.02.
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facts alleged in the complaint as true, a court could not possibly grant
the plaintiff the relief sought.52
B. Sta tute sofLim ita tion
1. Func tiona nd Polic y
Regardless of the adequacy of the facts alleged, a statute of
limitations may serve to bar a claim.53 Statutes of limitation impose
time limits on claims that can be brought before a court.54 Almost
every claim, with the exception of some criminal charges, has a
relevant statute of limitations specifying the timeframe in which the
claim must be brought.55 Either the court or the defendant can raise
the issue.56 If the court determines that the statute of limitations has
run, the court will dismiss the action.57
Statutes of limitation serve two primary purposes, both generally
benefiting defendants. The first purpose is to prevent bias and
excessive cost.58 The evidence necessary to successfully defend a
claim may be lost or altered with the passage of time.59 A statute of
limitations prevents plaintiffs from waiting to bring a claim until the
defendant’s position becomes too difficult or costly to prove.60

52. Noske , 670 N.W.2d at 743 (citing N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn.
391, 395, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963)); MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02.
53. Se e ,e .g ., MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (2018).
54. Se e id .; Backertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W.2d
694, 697 (Minn. 1937) (stating that the “general purpose [of statutes of limitation] is
to prescribe a period within which a right may be enforced, afterwards withholding a
remedy for reasons of private justice and public policy”) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
55. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
56. Se e ,e .g ., Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429,
441, 194 N.W.2d 767, 775 (1971) (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.03) (holding that statutes of
limitations must be pleaded as an affirmative defense); Mercer v. Andersen, 715
N.W.2d 114, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the lower court had authority to
consider the statute of limitations even though the defendant did not raise it).
57. Se e ,e .g ., Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Minn. 2006).
58. Id .; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
59. Antone , 720 N.W.2d 331; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
60. Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 697
(1937).
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The second purpose is security. Tort claims can be quite costly
for defendants and their insurers.61 This is especially true for
professionals and businesses that provide specialized services
affecting peoples’ livelihood or health, and even more so for
professionals that provide services to a large number of clients.62
Statutes of limitation allow defendants to arrange their personal lives
and business affairs without fear of indefinite liability.63
Limitations periods vary in length.64 For example, in Minnesota,
an action for libel or slander must be brought within two years,65
while an action for legal malpractice has a more generous limitations
period of six years.66
a . Ac c rua l
While the length of the limitations period is specified by statute,
the moment the time period begins, or the clock begins to run, is often
left up to the courts.67 This moment is referred to as the cause of
action’s “accrual.” Accrual of a statute of limitations is a contested
issue because it necessarily coincides with the deadline for the
plaintiff to bring their claim. For plaintiffs, meeting or missing this
deadline can be the difference between a big damage award or having
their claim dismissed. For defendants, getting a claim dismissed saves
a potential payout to the plaintiff, not to mention the cost, time, effort,
and reputational repercussions associated with defending the claim
on its merits.
For the sake of predictability, a cause of action’s accrual is often
governed by an “accrual rule.” These rules vary by type of claim,

61. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
62. Se e Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (“[L]iability
for negligence . . . may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”).
63. Id .; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
64. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
65. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(1) (2018).
66. Id .§ 541.05, subdiv. 1(5) (2018).
67. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241 (“Courts infuse a degree of flexibility in applying
statutes of limitation, principally but not exclusively by their control over the starting
time for the statutory clock and by their control over time-outs or tolling.”); se e ,e .g .,
Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 2018); se e a lsoAntone v. Mirviss, 720
N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 2006) (noting that there was division among the District Court,
Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court of Minnesota as to when the cause of action
accrued).
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length of the relevant statute of limitations, and jurisdiction.68 For
example, a jurisdiction with a relatively short statute of limitations for
a particular claim may abide by a more generous accrual rule,69 while
a jurisdiction with a longer limitations period may abide by a rule that
sets accrual earlier in time.70
1. The Oc c urre nc e Rule
Historically, a cause of action accrued when the negligent act
occurred, regardless of whether the plaintiff knew of the negligence
or of their injury.71 Courts applying this rule sought to reinforce the
policies behind statutes of limitation and reasoned that, in the
absence of fraud, courts should encourage diligence and discourage
unreasonable delay.72 The Minnesota Supreme Court has long held
that “ignorance of the existence of the cause of action” is not an
exception under which a court would pause or ignore a statute of
limitations.73
In some instances, the occurrence rule is harsh on plaintiffs who
are reasonably unaware until years later that the negligent act
occurred or that they were injured.74 Additionally, timing can be an
issue: a negligent act and the corresponding injury do not always

68. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 241.
69. Se e ,e .g ., John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1998)
(applying the more generous “discovery rule” where the statute of limitations was
one year); Edwards v. Dunlop-Gates, 344 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (applying
the discovery rule where the statute of limitations was two years).
70. Se e ,e .g ., Antone , 720 N.W.2d at 331 (applying the damage rule where the
statute of limitations was six years).
71. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 506, 122
N.W.2d 178, 180 (1963) (holding the claim accrued on the date of the accident); Mast
v. Easton, 33 Minn. 161, 163, 22 N.W. 253, 254 (1885) (holding the claim accrued on
the date the defendant failed to perform a duty).
72. Dalton v. Dow Chemical Co., 280 Minn. 147, 154–55, 158 N.W.2d 580, 585
(1968) (citing Weston v. Jones, 160 Minn. 32, 36, 199 N.W. 431, 433 (1924)).
73. W e ston, 160 Minn. at 36, 199 N.W. at 433 (citing M a st, 33 Minn. at 163–64,
22 N.W. at 254).
74. Se e ,e .g ., Shearin v. Lloyd, 98 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. 1957) (holding the medical
malpractice claim accrued on the date of the operation even when the plaintiff did not
know the doctor surgeon had left a sponge in her body).
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coincide, producing procedural issues,75 and sometimes neither can
be tied to a specific moment in time.76 Thus, in the 1960s and 70s,
courts began to abandon the occurrence rule in favor of more flexible
and nuanced accrual rules.
2. The Disc ove ryRule
Some courts responded to the harshness of the occurrence rule
by adopting the “discovery” rule.77 Under the discovery rule, the
accrual period begins as soon as a reasonable person would be aware
of the claim, regardless of when the negligent act or injury occurred.78
While the discovery rule obviates the harshness of the
occurrence rule for plaintiffs, it creates substantial uncertainty for
defendants and creates the risk of inconsistent application by the
courts.79 For example, courts may disagree about when a reasonable
person discovers an injury—is it upon the first showing of symptoms,
or upon diagnosis by a medical professional? Moreover, discovery of
what? The injury, the defendant’s possible negligence, or the
connection between the two?
The uncertainties tied to the discovery rule have two chief
adverse results. First, potential defendants may face liability for
actions taken many years—if not decades—in the past, contravening
the “repose” policy of statutes of limitation.80 Second, determining the

75. Antone , 720 N.W.2d at 335 (“[T]he occurrence rule ‘encourages speculative
litigation that can involve the client, the attorney and the courts in wasteful economic
behavior.’” (quoting 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 22.10,
at 303 (2006))); DOBBS, supra note 5, § 242 (“Such a provision could bar the claim
before the plaintiff could sue.”).
76. Se e Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 115–18, 248 N.W.2d 291, 295–96
(1976) (noting that the dates of negligence and injury were unclear because
allegations were based on a series of transactions).
77. Se e ,e .g ., Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 424–
25, 432–33 (Cal. 1971) (adopting the discovery rule for legal malpractice); Yoshizaki
v. Hilo Hosp., 433 P.2d 220, 223 (Haw. 1967) (adopting the discovery rule for medical
malpractice); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 255 A.2d 359, 362 (Md. 1969)
(adopting the discovery rule for legal malpractice).
78. Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn. 2006) (“[Under] the
‘discovery’ rule . . . the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to
run only when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.”).
79. Se e g e ne ra lly DOBBS, supra note 5, at § 243 (discussing the discovery rule’s
complicated terrain).
80. Se e ,e .g ., Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 2016) (showing the
lawsuit was filed in 2014 based on alleged exposure to toxic chemicals from 1959 to
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proper accrual date may involve a fact-specific analysis that is most
appropriately determined by a jury, rather than a judge,81 thus
requiring more time, effort, and money dedicated to defending the
claim. This undercuts the statute’s function in barring the claim
because it creates, rather than eliminates, issues for trial.
3. The Da m a g e Rule
Many courts found a different solution to the occurrence rule.
The circuit courts of appeals gradually adopted the “damage” rule,
under which the claim accrues on the date the plaintiff first incurred
legally cognizable damage.82 The circuit courts reasoned generally
that a court cannot require a plaintiff to bring a claim before the
plaintiff can establish each of the claim’s elements, including
damages.83 Requiring suit before this would result in speculative
litigation.
Persuaded by the circuit courts’ reasoning, the Minnesota
Supreme Court definitively adopted the damage rule in 1968 when it
decided Da lton v.Dow Che m ic a lCo., a case dealing with a toxic tort
claim.84 Toxic torts—or personal injury claims in which the plaintiff
alleges injury caused by exposure to a toxic substance—are especially
susceptible to statutes of limitation issues because the negligence and
the injury occur over a period of time, and the resulting diseases can
take years to manifest.85 Nevertheless, the court balanced this
injustice against limitations policies and settled on the damage rule
for torts in general, expressly rejecting the discovery rule.86 The
1968); Antone , 720 N.W.2d at 333 (showing the lawsuit was filed nearly seventeen
years after defendant’s malpractice).
81. DOBBS, supra note 5, at § 243.
82. Se e ,e .g ., Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1960);
U.S. v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[I]t is not the wrongful, i.e., negligent
act, which gives rise to the claim. For there must be damage caused by it.”); Carnes v.
U.S., 186 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1951) (quoting Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch
Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 827 (N.Y. 1936) (“It is only the injury to person or property
arising from negligence which constitutes an invasion of a personal right, protected
by law, and, therefore, an actionable wrong.”)).
83. Se e ,e .g ., Brush, 284 F.2d 797; Re id , 251 F.2d 691; Ca rne s, 186 F.2d 648.
84. Se e Dalton v. Dow Chemical Co., 280 Minn. 147, 154–55, 158 N.W.2d 580,
585 (1968).
85. Se e DOBBS, supra note 5, § 243.
86. Se e Da lton, 280 Minn. at 154–55, 158 N.W.2d at 585.
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Minnesota Supreme Court first applied the damage rule to a
professional malpractice claim in 1976,87 then specifically to a legal
malpractice claim in 1999.88
Of course, to know when “damage” occurred, one must determine
precisely what constitutes damage within the context of the claim. In
Antone v.M irviss, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that within the
context of a negligently drafted antenuptial agreement, compensable
damage occurs, and therefore a claim accrues on the marriage date.89
The court reasoned that the marriage is the point at which the married
person loses the ability to protect his or her property from a divorcing
spouse, and that this loss of ability constitutes sufficient damage to
support the damage element of the claim.90 Thus, no matter how small
the damage amount is on day one of the marriage, or how large it may
grow to be by the time the client discovers the malpractice and sues
the attorney, the client incurs damage when he or she passes the
“point of no return”—the marriage date.91
b . Othe rPla intiffProte c tions:Tolling a nd Estoppe l
As with most rules, statutes of limitation have exceptions. These
are especially necessary in jurisdictions with short limitations
periods, or defendant-favoring accrual rules. A statute of limitations
may be “tolled”—or paused—in certain circumstances under which it
would be equitable to do so.92 In these situations, the court maintains
the same period specified in the statute but tolls it or delays its start
until the extraordinary circumstance no longer exists.93
A statute of limitations may be wholly ignored if the defendant
causes the delay, in which case the defendant is “estopped” from

87. Se e g e ne ra lly Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976)
(applying the discovery rule in an accounting malpractice action).
88. Se e Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999).
89. Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 2006). The Antone court also
expressly rejected arguments that the plaintiff’s claim accrued either when he
incurred legal fees defending his assets in his divorce or when the assets were
awarded to his ex-wife. This came too close to the discovery rule, and therefore, too
close to uncertainty in the law and open-ended liability for attorneys. Id .at 336–39.
90. Id .at 338–39.
91. Id .at 337.
92. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 246 (listing the plaintiff’s minority, mental
incompetence, or incarceration as examples).
93. Id .

2019]

NOTE: MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE FACTORS

1059

invoking it.94 A defendant most often causes the delay by fraudulently
concealing the cause of action.95 When a plaintiff alleges fraudulent
concealment, Minnesota law requires courts to apply discovery rule
principles, in which the statute of limitations accrues as soon as the
plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the cause of action.96
2. Se pa ra ting N e g lig e nc e Cla im s
When the statute of limitations has run and no tolling rule
applies, the plaintiff has one more option: alleging a separate claim
with a separate, more favorable limitations period. For example, if the
plaintiff has a choice of jurisdiction or forum in which to sue, it may
be that one of the jurisdictions has a more forgiving statute of
limitations. The plaintiff may also be able to choose between legal
theories. For instance, some sets of facts may support either a tort
claim or a breach of contract claim, and a late-suing plaintiff may
choose the theory with the longer corresponding limitations period.97
Another option is to allege a separate act of negligence occurring
later in time. The Minnesota Supreme Court has suggested that
multiple causes of action for negligence can arise out of the same set
of facts.98 However, before deciding Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h, the court
had not addressed how or when a plaintiff can successfully allege
separate claims.99
The question of separating claims appears in three unpublished
opinions by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. First, in De ve re a ux v.
94. Id .
95. Id .(claiming a defendant can also do so by force or threat).
96. Se e Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(6) (2016) (“[O]n the ground of fraud . . .
the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”).
97. Se e Phutchaya Numngern, Note, The Concurrent Liability in Contract and
Tort Under U.S. and English Law, Digital Repository @ Maurer Law (2017),
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&contex
t=etd [https://perma.cc/R5L9-87M4].
98. Cf.Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693–95 (Minn. 1980) (analyzing
separately whether an attorney gave advice without proper research and whether an
attorney failed to point out the statute of limitations for the same client at the same
meeting); Capitol Supply Co. v. St. Paul, 316 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. 1982) (applying
two limitations periods for two separate claims of negligent change in the grade of a
road and negligent design and construction).
99. 907 N.W.2d 167, 174 (Minn. 2018).
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Stroup, the court of appeals held that when an attorney gave bad tax
advice and then performed negligent litigation services during the
resulting lawsuit, the two acts gave rise to separate claims, each with
its own statute of limitations.100 The court’s primary reasons were
that the two acts occurred at different times, the second act worsened
the client’s position, and the two acts were “distinct.”101
In N a sh v.Gurovitsc h, an attorney handling his client’s divorce
failed to pursue a waiver which would have prevented his client’s exwife from later asking the court to increase spousal maintenance.102
When the client’s ex-wife eventually asked the court to increase
spousal maintenance, the judge awarded the increase based on a
statement in the client’s affidavit that was prepared by the attorney.103
The client sued the attorney, alleging that the failure to pursue the
waiver and the alleged negligent drafting of the affidavit were
separate claims.104 The court agreed, stating that because “[t]he two
acts occurred at different times, [they] are not necessarily causally
connected, and arose in legal representation concerning different
proceedings.”105
Finally, in Ge a rin v. Ba ile y’s N urse rie s, Inc ., the defendant
negligently dumped soil in the plaintiff’s backyard.106 The court held
that the subsequent act of moving the soil to her neighbor’s property
was not a separate act of negligence because it was related to
mitigating the damage.107 The court also held that the resulting
seepage of toxins into the plaintiff’s drinking water was not a separate
act because it was a “progression” of the first negligent act of dumping
the soil.108 These three cases ultimately provided the foundation for
the five-factor balancing test established in Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h.109

100. No. A07-0103, 2008 WL 73712, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2008).
101. Id .at *3.
102. No. A10-1489, 2011 WL 1237546, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011).
103. Id .
104. Id .
105. Id .at *2.
106. No. A11-595, 2012 WL 34035, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2012).
107. Id .at *2.
108. Id .
109. 907 N.W.2d 167, 175–76 (Minn. 2018); se e infra , Part D: The M inne sota
Supre m e CourtDe c ision.
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III. FREDERICK V. WALLERICH
A. DissolutionProc e e d ing
On September 28, 2006, Joseph Frederick hired Kay Wallerich, an
attorney at Farrish Johnson Law Office in Mankato, Minnesota, to draft
an antenuptial agreement before he married Cynthia Gatliff.110 The
agreement stipulated that Gatliff would not receive Frederick’s
premarital assets or appreciation therefrom if the couple divorced.111
The couple married the next day, on September 29, 2006.112
In September of 2007, Frederick met with Wallerich again to plan
and draft a new will.113 Frederick alleged that at that meeting,
Wallerich assured him the antenuptial agreement was enforceable,114
and addressed it in the will.115 Frederick continued to hire Wallerich
for related matters until 2011.116
Frederick and Gatliff began discussing divorce in the fall of 2012,
and Gatliff served Frederick with dissolution papers in December of
2012.117 Gatliff argued in the dissolution proceeding that the
antenuptial agreement was unenforceable because it lacked the
statutorily-required witness signatures,118 and that she was therefore
entitled to the share of Frederick’s assets that the agreement aimed to
protect—his premarital assets and their appreciation during the

110. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2018).
111. Id .
112. Id .at 171.
113. Id .
114. Id .
115. Id .at 171. Butse e id .at 185 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (“I have entered into an
Antenuptial Agreement prior to executing this Will. I have intentionally omitted my
spouse from taking under this will as we have provided for bequests at our death by
separate written instrument dated September 28, 2006 [the antenuptial agreement].
Should such instrument be deemed void pursuant to law, it is my intent to omit my
spouse from taking under this Will.”).
116. Id .at 171.
117. Frederick v. Wallerich, No. 07-CV-15-2151, 2015 WL 9921333, at *1 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2015), re v’d , 907 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 2018).
118. MINN. STAT. § 519.11, subdiv. 2 (2016) (“Antenuptial . . . contracts . . . shall be
in writing, executed in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged by the
parties . . . .”).
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marriage.119 The judge agreed with Gatliff and ordered the parties to
participate in appellate mediation.120 Mediation resulted in
settlement, in which Frederick agreed to pay Gatliff a share of his
premarital assets, including appreciation.121 Frederick paid Gatliff $1
million more than he would have if the antenuptial agreement had
been enforceable.122
B. Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h inthe Distric tCourt
In September of 2013, in the midst of the dissolution
proceedings, Frederick filed suit against Wallerich and Farrish
Johnson (collectively “Wallerich”).123 As to the drafting of the
antenuptial agreement in 2006, the six-year statute of limitations124
had undisputedly run.125 Nevertheless, Frederick sued Wallerich for
legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent/reckless
misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment to induce equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations.126 The district court ruled that all
four claims arose out of the same incident, and thus dismissed all but
the legal malpractice claim.127
With no tolling or alternative claims available, Frederick asserted
that the court should view his case like De ve re a ux, 128 in which
separate negligent actions by an attorney throughout representation
were considered separate instances of malpractice for statute of
limitations purposes.129 Specifically, Frederick asked the court to
consider each family law and estate planning meeting with Wallerich
119. Fre d e ric k, 2015 WL 9921333, at *1 (citing Order of Hon. Bradley C. Walker
in Blue Earth County Court File 07-FA-13-1671).
120. Id .
121. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167 171 (Minn. 2018).
122. Id .at 175.
123. Fre d e ric k, 2015 WL 9921333, at *2.
124. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5) (2018) (establishing a six-year statute of
limitations for legal malpractice claims).
125. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 173 (citing Antone v. Mirviss, (“There is no dispute
that a claim accrued on the date of the marriage, September 29, 2006, for the errors
that Wallerich made when she failed to ensure that the antenuptial agreement was
validly executed. The claim based on that negligent act is unquestionably untimely
because it was not filed by September 29, 2012.”) (citations omitted)).
126. Fre d e ric k, 2015 WL 9921333, at *3.
127. Id .
128. Id .at *4.
129. Devereaux v. Stroup, No. A07-0103, 2008 WL 73712, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 8, 2008).
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as potential separate instances of malpractice.130 If the court was
willing to do this, the statute of limitations would not have accrued
until less than six years before the suit was filed, allowing Frederick
to continue to pursue his claim.131
Wallerich moved to dismiss, arguing that the only compensable
damages Frederick could allege stemmed from the 2006 drafting and
that, unlike in De ve re a ux, none of her subsequent legal services
aggravated those damages.132 The district court agreed, holding that
Frederick could not allege separate damages, and that according to
Antone , his claim accrued on the date of his marriage to Gatliff.133 The
district court also noted that as a policy matter, “splitting” the claims
as Frederick suggested would be contrary to the purpose of statutes
of limitation and would essentially amount to tolling,134 an equitable
protection that the court had already decided not to extend.135
Moreover, the district court posited that separating the claims would
resemble an adoption of the continuous representation doctrine,
which can only be applied in rare circumstances when the accrual
date cannot be determined.136 The district court granted Wallerich’s
motion and dismissed the claim altogether.137

130. Fre d e ric k, 2015 WL 9921333, at *4.
131. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 2018). (“Because
Frederick filed his legal-malpractice claim on September 10, 2013, there must be a
separate claim that accrued on or after September 10, 2007, for the filing to be
timely.”).
132. Fre d e ric k, 2015 WL 9921333, at *4.
133. Id .at *3 (explaining that under the damage rule, “damages” are broadly
defined as any compensable damage as determined by the court, regardless of
whether the plaintiff properly identifies them in the complaint).
134. Id .at *4.
135. Se e id .at *3.
136. Id .at *5 (c om pa ring Carlson v. Houk, No. A14-0633, 2014 WL 6090685, at
*5 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2014) (refusing to apply the continuous representation
doctrine because the plaintiff’s damages were attributable to discrete, determinable
instances of malpractice), w ith Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 116–18, 248 N.W.2d
291, 296 (Minn. 1976) (setting the accrual date at the representation end date only
after the court concluded it could not determine the precise date on which damage
was incurred)).
137. Id .at *5.
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C. Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h inthe M inne sota CourtofAppe a ls
Frederick appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.138 The
court of appeals agreed that Frederick’s only cognizable damage
accrued on the date of his marriage and agreed that the case was
different from De ve re a ux because none of Wallerich’s later legal
services “significantly worsen[ed] or enhance[d]” Frederick’s
damages from the 2006 act.139
The court also affirmed the dismissal of Frederick’s claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and negligent/reckless misrepresentation,
reasoning that those claims fell under “the penumbra of his legalmalpractice action.”140 Finally, the court held that Frederick did not
allege sufficient facts to support equitable tolling for his fraudulent
concealment claim.141 The court reasoned that the antenuptial
agreement included lines for witness signatures that were obviously
blank, belying a claim that their blankness could have been
concealed.142 Additionally, Frederick failed to allege any intentional
misconduct on Wallerich’s part, a key element of fraud.143
D. The M inne sota Supre m e CourtDe c ision
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide, as a
matter of first impression, how and when a plaintiff can allege
separate acts of legal malpractice for purposes of statutes of limitation
accrual dates.144 In a 5-2 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district
court.145 The court held that Wallerich’s 2007 services for Frederick
created an independent cause of action because they were sufficiently
independent from Wallerich’s initial negligent acts in 2006.146 The
court determined, and the parties did not dispute, that the attorney-

138. Frederick v. Wallerich, No. A15-2052, 2016 WL 4068931, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 1, 2016), re v’d , 907 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 2018).
139. Id .
140. Id .at *4.
141. Id .at *5.
142. Id .
143. Id .(citing Williamson v. Prasciunas, 661 N.W.2d 645, 651–52 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003) (stating that a party must show that statements were intentionally false in
order to prove a claim of fraudulent concealment).
144. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 174 (Minn. 2018).
145. Id .at 181.
146. Id .at 176–77, 181.
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client relationship element was clearly satisfied in 2007, just as it was
in 2006.147 Therefore, what ultimately qualified the two claims as
separate arose out of a special analysis of the other three elements:
(1) [W]hether Wallerich’s [2007] failures . . . could be
independent acts of negligence from the negligent execution
of the antenuptial agreement itself; (2) whether Frederick
suffered damages caused by these failures; and (3) whether
those damages are independent of the damages attributable
to the negligent execution of the antenuptial agreement.148
Writing for the majority, Justice Hudson laid out a five-factor
balancing test, gleaning factors from the three Minnesota Court of
Appeals cases that addressed the issue—De ve re a ux, Ge a rin, and
N a sh.149 The court held that the negligent drafting of the antenuptial
agreement in 2006 and the incorporation of it into the will in 2007
were separate acts of negligence with separate statutes of limitations
because: (1) the second act “significantly worsened” Frederick’s
position; (2) the two acts were of different “types”; “(3) the [two] acts
occurred at different times and, importantly, during different
transactions;” (4) the second act did not flow causally from the first;
and (5) the second act relied explicitly on the prior work.150 In a
subsequent, unrelated malpractice case, the court suggested that the
indispensable condition was that “a d d itiona ldamages” arose out of
the “se c ond negligent act.”151
Throughout the Fre d e ric k opinion, the court offered some
caveats. First, at the first mention of the five factors, the court
indicated that the list of factors was not exhaustive and would not
apply to every case.152 Second, the court noted that to successfully
separate the claims, Frederick would need to convince the fact-finder
of independent damages and causation.153 Finally, the court stressed

147. Id .at 173.
148. Id .at 173–74 (emphasis omitted).
149. Id .at 170, 175–76.
150. Id .at 176.
151. Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, 916 N.W.2d 491,
499 (Minn. 2018) (quoting Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 179) (emphasis in original).
152. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 176 n.5 (“Although we found these facts helpful in
our analysis here, we do not suggest that these are the exclusive considerations, nor
that these considerations will be helpful in every case.”).
153. Id .at 175–76, 181.
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that the procedural posture of the case—the pleading stage—was
important.154 Because the question in this case revolved around a
motion to dismiss at the pleading stage, the holding was limited to
whether the plaintiff had minimally alleged legal malpractice in the
complaint, rather than proven his claim.155
E. The Disse nt
Chief Justice Gildea, joined by Justice Anderson, dissented on all
fronts.156 The dissent reasoned that allowing Frederick to separate his
claims on the facts alleged amounted to overruling Antone for cases
where the client and the attorney who drafted the antenuptial
agreement continue to work together.157 The dissent would have held
that, consistent with Antone , Frederick’s only claim accrued on the
date of his marriage.158
The dissent emphasized that under the damage rule, “damage” is
any legally cognizable damage. Defined broadly, it does not matter
what damages are identified in the complaint, how or when the
ultimate amount at issue accrued, or when that ultimate amount
became calculable.159 Rather, “damage” accrued at the point of no
return, when Frederick lost the full ability to defend his assets on the
date of his marriage.160
Further, the dissent argued against the five-factor test, regardless
of whether Antone applied.161 It reasoned that because Frederick did
not successfully allege a separate claim under any reasonable test,
setting out a standard for separate claims is inappropriate.162
Moreover, the dissent called the five-factor test unworkable and
predicted it would cause confusion in future malpractice actions.163
Finally, the dissent argued against the court’s application of its
five-factor test.164 First, the dissent disagreed with the court’s
characterization of “additional damages,” asserting that appreciation
154. Id .at 181.
155. Id .
156. Id .at 181–86 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id .at 181.
158. Id .at 184.
159. Id .at 183 (citing Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 336, 338 (Minn. 2006)).
160. Id .
161. Id .at 185.
162. Id .
163. Id .at 181.
164. Id .at 185–86.
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of already irrevocably compromised assets did not qualify as
“additional” because no act in 2007 caused that appreciation.165
Second, the will’s mention of the antenuptial agreement was
irrelevant because the will neither “incorporated” it, nor relied on
it.166
IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis begins by addressing the significance of the
Frederick case in the local legal community and highlighting some of
the problematic standards set by the court’s decision. It continues by
proposing a clearer way to frame the issue, focusing on the ideas of
breach and causation, which would not alter the court’s decision, but
would make the law in this area more navigable. Next, this analysis
examines an approach that focuses on duty, and concludes with
recommendations as to how attorneys might better manage attorneyclient relationships and avoid liability.
A. Pre d ic tionsa nd Re a c tions
1. Unc e rta intyinthe Le g a lCom m unity
Pending the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, the case was
closely watched by members of the local legal community.167 Fearing
increased exposure to malpractice claims, one commentator
predicted the decision “could make it easier for clients to get around
Minnesota’s statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims and sue
their lawyers.”168 Conversely, a Minnesota State Bar Association
Bench and Bar reporter argued that the bright-line rule setting accrual
on the date of the marriage is too harsh on plaintiffs.169 Because of the

165. Id .at 185.
166. Id .(emphasis omitted).
167. Mike Mosedale, Le g a l M a lpra c tic e Ca se Ra ise s Exposure Fe a rs, MINNESOTA
LAWYER (Mar. 14, 2017), https://minnlawyer.com/2017/03/14/legal-malpracticecase-raises-exposure-fears/ [https://perma.cc/7GDZ-DXJU].
168. Id .
169. MSBA in Action, 75-MAR Bench & B. Minn. 6 (“We agree with the Minnesota
State Bar Association and note that [the] rule [advanced by appellant] is too broad
because it assumes that every client, in revisiting previous work, prefers the last
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significance of the decision on Minnesota legal malpractice claims,
three attorney organizations submitted briefs as amici curiae.
2. Am ic i— Ad voc a ting forCle a rSta nd a rd s
The Minnesota State Bar Association (MSBA),170 the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML),171 and the Professional
Liability Defense Federation (PLDF)172 weighed in with amicus briefs.
All were motivated by an interest in clearly articulated legal principles
for malpractice.173
The AAML and the PLDF filed in support of Wallerich. Both
characterized Frederick’s theory of the case as an attempt to elude the
statute of limitations on Wallerich’s negligence in 2006.174 The PLDF
advocated for strict application of the Antone rule, reasoning that
consistent, predictable application outweighs the occasional
harshness of statutes of limitation.175
The AAML also advocated for the Antone rule.176 Additionally,
AAML argued that Wallerich’s assurances in 2007 did not constitute
legal advice and, moreover, that Frederick failed to allege distinct
damages flowing from the 2007 meeting.177 Further, the AAML feared
a ruling in Frederick’s favor would create a “system of perverse
incentives” within continuing attorney-client relations: attorneys

option: to have the attorney conductnew researchand analysis e ve ry tim e a clientask s a
question.W e therefore rej
ect[appellant’s]proposed bright-line rule.”).
170. Brief for the Minnesota State Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, Frederick,
907 N.W.2d 167 (No. A15-2052), 2016 WL 8467740 [hereinafter MSBA Brief].
171. Brief for the Minnesota Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d 167 (No.
A15-2052), 2017 WL 957391 [hereinafter AAML Brief].
172. Brief for the Professional Liability Defense Federation as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d 167 (No. A15-2052), 2017 WL
957391 [hereinafter PLDF Brief].
173. MSBA Brief, supra note 170, at *1; AAML Brief, supra note 171, at *1; PLDF
Brief, supra note 172, at *2.
174. AAML Brief, supra note 171, at *7 (“Frederick attempts to elude the statute
of limitations by dividing his ‘damages’ into those resulting from the improperly
drafted antenuptial agreement, and those incurred because of Wallerich’s later
reassurances as to its validity.”); PLDF Brief, supra note 172, at *9 (“[A] party should
not be allowed to manipulate the statute of limitations by artful construction of a
pleading through reference to multiple acts.”).
175. PLDF Brief, supra note 172, at *1–4.
176. AAML Brief, supra note 171, at *4, *7.
177. Id .at *6.
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would become reluctant to consult with returning clients if they
incurred new duties each time,178 and savvy clients might extend
statutes of limitation by asking for regular reassurances of the validity
of prior work.179
The MSBA remained neutral. The MSBA’s brief advocated for a
rule under which an attorney’s duty to their client is limited to the
scope of the engagement as agreed upon, whether orally or in writing,
in the retainer agreement.180 Under this “scope of engagement” rule,
if the court found the facts in the complaint sufficient to support a
specific, agreed-upon duty to review the antenuptial agreement, the
court could allow Frederick to continue to pursue his claim.181
3. Cre a ting Unc e rta inty
The purpose of a state supreme court’s power of review is to
clarify the law and set precedent for lower courts in the interest of
creating and maintaining a coherent body of law for the state’s
citizens.182 However, when Fre d e ric k was published, the decision
raised more questions than it answered. Commentators disagreed

178. Id .at *2–3.
179. Id .at *8–9.
180. MSBA Brief, supra note 170, at *11.
181. Id . at *17.
182. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 117, subdiv. 2; Minnesota Court Rules: Appellate
Procedure, Case Dispositional Procedures of the Minnesota Supreme Court: Obtaining
Discretionary Review, The Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2011),
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/rule/apcase/ [https://perma.cc/54DBJ8EB] (“[T]he Supreme Court’s primary role in reviewing Court of Appeals decisions
is to set precedent that develops and clarifies the law on important issues of broad
impact.”).
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about whether the decision made the law clearer.183 Commentators
also disagreed whether the decision abandoned Antone .184
Despite this disagreement, one thing seemed certain: like the
Tog sta d decision in 1980,185 Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h would affect
attorney exposure to malpractice claims.186
B. Fa c t-Spe c ific Inquiry:N oEa syTa sk
One attorney recommended that firms “have knowledgeable
counsel conduct the fact-specific inquiry outlined by the court.”187
However, even if firms follow this advice, attorneys and courts will
likely run into issues applying the Fre d e ric k test to other factual
scenarios because, as one attorney suggested, the holding seemed
limited to specific facts:
In this case, the new legal work, drafting of a new will, combined
with the failure to determine if the antenuptial agreement that was
incorporated into the will was still valid, combined with the lost

183. Com pa re Ryan M. Lawrence, Suing the Lawyers Gets Easier, Minn. Law.
https://www.anthonyostlund.com/news/suing-the-lawyers-gets-easier
[https://perma.cc/NK38-AFP2] (“[T]he court clarified when multiple acts by the
same lawyer may give rise to separate claims for legal malpractice.”), w ith Kristine
Goodrich, Supreme Court Revives Malpractice Suit Against Mankato Firm, Mankato
Free Press (Feb. 8, 2018) (quoting Wallerich’s attorney, Barry O’Neil),
http://www.mankatofreepress.com/news/local_news/supreme-court-revivesmalpractice-suit-against-mankato-firm/article_0668e84e-0d1d-11e8-a102abe8fbda9965.html [https://perma.cc/6PRT-TY6E] (“The Minnesota Supreme Court
appears to create uncertainty in an area of the law that seemed clear based on its
prior decisions . . . .”).
184. Cf.Peter L. Gregory, MN Supreme Court Walks Back “Some Damage” Rule of
Accrual for LPL Claims, Prof. Liability Def. Fed’n (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.pldf.org/blogpost/982277/294356/MN-Supreme-Court-walks-backsome-damage-rule-of-accrual-for-LPL-claims [https://perma.cc/3U86-2YW2].
185. Se e Hoover, supra note 28, at 4.
186. Gregory, supra note 184 (stating the holding “walk[ed] back” the damage
rule); Lawrence, supra note 183 (“The Minnesota Supreme Court recently expanded
liability for attorney malpractice.”); One Lawyer, One Agreement, One Will: Multiple
Claims,
Professional
Liability
Attorney
Network (Feb.
27, 2017)
https://www.planattorney.org/articles/one-lawyer-one-agreement-one-willmultiple-claims/ [https://perma.cc/KBF4-XEWB] (reporting on the case as relevant
to attorney liability).
187. Lawrence, supra note 183.
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opportunity to prevent additional damages from occurring (some
damage), can start a new legal malpractice claim.188
Nevertheless, attorneys may be confronted with the five-factor
test if the statute of limitations is at issue in a malpractice claim.
Tackling this test may be a difficult endeavor because the “different
types” and “separate times and separate transactions” factors are
susceptible to different interpretations and, therefore, inconsistent
application by courts.
1. Inc onsiste ntApplic a tion
a . Diffe re ntType s
First, the two acts being of “different types” invites inconsistent
application because it invites parsing and cherry-picking of facts. In
Fre d e ric k, the court of appeals held that the two acts—the negligent
drafting of the antenuptial agreement and the bad advice a year
later—related to the same legal issue : the antenuptial agreement.189
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged this was true, but
explained that nevertheless, the two acts were sufficiently different
because they involved different a re a s of law (family and estate
planning) and different legal proje c ts(an antenuptial agreement and
a will).190 The dissent pushed back, taking the court of appeals’
reasoning one step further: “for all practical purposes, Frederick
alleges merely one error that was repeated: Wallerich failed to secure
an enforceable antenuptial agreement . . . .”191 The divergence of

188. Robert A. McLeod, 2018 Non-Tax Case Law Update, 2018 Probate & Trust
Law Section Conference-June 4 & 5, 2018, at 2, https://www.minncle.org/eAccess/1
020951801/Plen_Day_1_9am_Mcleod.pdf [https://perma.cc/P64A-8X2Q].
189. Frederick v. Wallerich, A15-2052, 2016 WL 4068931, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 1, 2016) (“[T]he alleged misconduct from 2006–2011 is limited to improper
advice concerning the validity of the antenuptial agreement.”).
190. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 175–76 (Minn. 2018) (“Wallerich’s
negligent conduct in 2007—failing to advise Frederick of the invalidity of the
antenuptial agreement—spanned multiple areas of law (estate planning and marital
planning), and multiple legal projects (execution of a will and an antenuptial
agreement).”).
191. Id .at 184 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Fredrick also later “failed to
verify that the agreement she had secured was in fact enforceable.”).
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opinions shows that courts and attorneys will likely continue to differ
on the issue of “different types” of negligent acts.192
The “different types” factor was applied differently in Tog sta d ,
where the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s
decision to instruct the jury on two separate theories of negligence.193
The first theory was whether the defendant-attorney failed to
adequately research the viability of Ms. Togstad’s claim before
informing her that he did not think she had a claim.194 The second
theory was whether it was negligent not to advise Ms. Togstad on the
statute of limitations for her potential claim.195 The court
characterized both as negligent legal advice.196
b . Se pa ra te Tim e sa nd Se pa ra te Tra nsa c tions
The “separate times and separate transactions” factor invites
inconsistent application because it is not supported by the cases.
Though it may be conceptually clearer that actions are separate if they
occurred at separate times and in separate transactions, the fact that
they occurred at the same time has not precluded separation of
negligence theories in the past.197 Indeed, for the court’s threshold
proposition that multiple causes of action for negligence can arise out
of the same set of facts, it cites two cases where the two separate
negligent acts occurred at the same time.198 In Tog sta d , the court
separately evaluated two claims arising from one meeting, where no
other communication between the attorney and client occurred.199 In
Ca pitolSupply, the court held that there were two relevant statutes of
limitation arising out of the same event where the plaintiff adequately

192. Se e Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 338 (citing a difference in
application of a legal rule between the court of appeals and dissent as evidence the
rule would create ambiguity in the law).
193. Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 694 (Minn. 1980).
194. Id .
195. Id .
196. Id .at 693–94 (explicitly referring to and treating both actions as legal
advice).
197. Se e ,e .g ., Capitol Supply Co. v. St. Paul, 316 N.W.2d 554, 554–55 (Minn. 1982);
Tog sta d , 291 N.W.2d at 690.
198. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 174–75 (Minn. 2018) (citing
Tog sta d and Ca pitol Supply Co.) (“Our law therefore permits two separate
transactions within the same set of facts to be reasonably characterized as separate
acts that give rise to independent negligence claims.”).
199. Tog sta d , 291 N.W.2d at 690.
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alleged two separate claims: the city “c onte m pora ne ouslyaltered the
road and redesigned the sewer system.”200
Thus, two negligence theories may arise out of acts occurring at
the same time. Strictly applied, this factor could bar perfectly valid
claims. A court asked to evaluate this factor should be reminded that
it may help bolster a finding that two acts were sufficiently separate,
but it should not be applied in the inverse to bar separate theories of
negligence that occur around the same time or within the same
transaction.
2. Othe rRe a sonstoW orry
The court’s notions of “additional damages” and “incorporation
by reference” should also worry attorneys.
a . Ad d itiona lDa m a g e s
The court’s finding of “additional” damages is suspect. The court
held that because Frederick’s assets (which he ultimately lost in the
divorce proceeding) had appreciated after the 2007 meeting,
Frederick incurred “additional” damages sufficient to support a claim
based on the 2007 meeting alone.201 By the court’s reasoning, a
malpractice action stemming from a transaction affecting assets that
appreciate can be re-opened any time the attorney assists with a
se c ond transaction affecting the same assets. Put another way, if the
assets increased in value between the two transactions, there are new
and separate damages for purposes of pleading a malpractice claim
based solely on the second transaction. The problem with this
reasoning is that the attorney’s actions have nothing to do with the
market forces that caused the appreciation. As the dissent notes,
Frederick’s damages remained unchanged; the value of his assets
simply continued to appreciate as they naturally would. Additionally,
the fact that Frederick lost an opportunity to mitigate already
compromised assets is a problematic theory of harm in tort.202
Conversely, if a plaintiff adequately alleges that the attorney’s
second act a c c e le ra te d or c om pound e d the original damages, that

200. Ca pitolSupplyCo., 907 N.W2d at 554–55 (emphasis added).
201. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 179.
202. Id .
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plaintiff may have a sufficient basis for dividing damages. These
concepts imply a separate, independent causal force that changes the
damages from what they would have been. Further, this notion of
additional damages is far less likely to impose liability for a second
act.203
As transactional attorneys are likely well aware, clients’ assets
tend to appreciate. The court’s definition of separate damages,
therefore, should cause transactional attorneys to be wary of handling
matters for returning clients. The Fre d e ric k court’s conclusion
regarding “additional damages” could undermine the entire practice
of family law, as well as other practice areas that serve regular clients
for obviously beneficial reasons, including efficiency, client
preference, and attorney business planning.204
b . Inc orpora tionofPriorW ork
The way the court characterizes “incorporation by reference” is
also problematic. As the court notes,205 Black’s Law Dictionary defines
incorporation by reference as “[a] method of making a secondary
document part of a primary document by including in the primary
document a statement that the secondary document should be treated
as if it were contained within the primary one.”206 However, the will
in Fre d e ric k explicitly stated that “[s]hould [the antenuptial
agreement] be deemed void pursuant to law, it is my intent to omit
my spouse from taking under this Will.”207 This statement explicitly
provided for the possibility that the antenuptial agreement was
invalid. In doing so, the will separated itself from the agreement,
declaring that no matter the effect of the agreement, it did not affect
the terms of the will. This should worry transactional attorneys, who
may make similar cross-references between documents that affect the
same assets.

203. Cf.Benjamin B. Cooper, W he nClie ntsSue The irLa w ye rsforFa iling toRe port
The ir Ow n M a lpra c tic e , 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 441, 443 (2016) (discussing malpractice
action based on a failure to report past malpractice) (“[A] client is unlikely to be able
to assert a professional negligence claim because the client will typically not be able
to establish any additional injury over and above the damage caused by the
underlying malpractice.”).
204. AAML Brief, supra note 171, at 2–3, 8–9.
205. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 171 n.1.
206. Inc orpora tionb yRe fe re nc e , BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
207. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 185 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
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C. AnAlte rna tive Fra m e w ork:Bre a c h,Ca usa tion,a nd Da m a g e s
To make the law clearer, the court could have used ordinary tort
principles to analyze whether Frederick alleged sufficient facts to
support a separate breach, separate causation, and separate damages
from the original claim. While no in-depth analysis of any of these
factors is required at the pleading stage, the court still must determine
whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged their legal claim.208 Using
the Fre d e ric k court’s factors within the long-established negligence
framework would make it easier for practitioners to navigate and
avoid duplicative analysis. This section outlines a way to do this,
framing two of the factors under “breach” and two under
“causation.”209
1. Bre a c h
Whether two alleged acts of negligence were of different “types,”
and whether the acts of negligence occurred at separate times and in
separate transactions, appear to examine whether Frederick
sufficiently alleged separate instances of breach. Breach in legal
malpractice is any instance in which an attorney’s conduct falls below
the standard of care of a reasonable attorney.210 In the transactional
context, Dobbs’ examples of breach include negligently drafting
documents, searching records, and giving legal advice.211 Here,
Wallerich negligently drafted an antenuptial agreement in 2006 and
allegedly gave negligent legal advice in 2007.212 These two acts align
perfectly with the separate examples enumerated by Dobbs.213
Accordingly, the court could have asked whether Frederick alleged
two separate breaches. Under this analysis, the court could have listed

208. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02.
209. Se e Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 176.While there are five factors, the fifth factor
(whether “the subsequent act specifically and explicitly incorporated and relied on
the continued validity of Wallerich’s prior work”) is somewhat of a threshold matter
and asks whether the two acts are sufficiently related that damage seeming to flow
from the first could also flow from the second. Id .
210. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 721.
211. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 721.
212. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 174, 176–77.
213. Se e DOBBS, supra note 5, § 721.
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different types and different times as persuasive factual bases for the
breach analysis.
2. Ac tua lCa use a nd Da m a g e s
Whether the client, after the first act of negligence, is in a
significantly worse position due to the second act of negligence
depends on actual causation and separate damages.214 Actual
causation is established if, but for the alleged act of negligence, the
harm would not have occurred.215 Here, the court stated that because
Wallerich’s acts in 2007 prevented Frederick from protecting his
assets at that time, and “led to” six additional years of appreciation of
Frederick’s assets, the “additional damages” would not have occurred
without Wallerich’s second act of negligence.216 The court held that
without the alleged act of negligence—Wallerich’s reassurances—
Frederick would have avoided a $1 million loss in his divorce.217
Additionally, the court’s analysis of this factor duplicated its butfor causation analysis. In its analysis of whether Frederick adequately
alleged but-for causation, the court cited the same facts: that but for
Wallerich’s negligence in 2007, Frederick would have taken steps,
such as divorcing Gatliff, to avoid appreciation of the damages.218 The
court could have combined these two analyses and stated that a
significant worsening of the client’s position was instructive as to
whether a plaintiff has alleged sufficiently separate but-for causation.
3. Proxim a te Ca use
Whether there is a causal connection between the two negligent
acts such that the second was a natural progression of the first, or was
unavoidable after the first act occurred, is a question of proximate
cause.219 Proximate cause serves the purpose of limiting liability when

214. At first glance, this factor looks like a question of “Superseding Cause,” but
rather than asking this question for purposes of whether Wallerich should be relieved
of liability for the first act because of the occurrence of the second act, a question
irrelevant to this case, the court uses this factor to divide causation and damages. Se e
Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 175.
215. Se e ,e .g ., Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Minn. 2003); Togstad v.
Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 695 (Minn. 1980).
216. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 175.
217. Id .
218. Id .at 180.
219. Se e Lewellin v. Huber, 465 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. 1991).

2019]

NOTE: MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE FACTORS

1077

a negligent act is a but-for cause, but for policy reasons, the defendant
should not be held liable.220 When there are two alleged causes at
issue, the second-in-time cause can only supersede the first if it
“change[s] the natural course of events by making the result different
from what it would have been” if only the first cause had existed.221 If
the second act was unavoidable as a result of the first, then it cannot
be a superseding cause, and thus cannot be the proximate cause of
damages.222 If the second act is unavoidable as a result of the first, then
the two are considered to be part of an unbroken “chain of events,”
proximately caused by the first act only.223 Here, the two acts at issue
were both but-for causes according to the court. The court
established, and the parties did not dispute, that the negligence in
2006 would have supported a cause of action had it not been barred
by the statute of limitations,224 and that Frederick sufficiently alleged
that the 2007 act was a but-for cause. Because the court found two
but-for causes, a simple analysis of whether the first act made the
other unavoidable, informed by authority on proximate cause, would
be a clearer way to analyze this issue.225

220. Id .(quoting William L. Prosser, The M inne sota CourtonProxim a te Ca use , 21
MINN. L. REV. 19, 22 (1937)) (“[L]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so close to the result, or of such significance as causes, that the law is
justified in imposing liability.”).
221. STEENSON, supra note 6, § 27.20.
222. Id .(citing Sowada v. Motzko, 256 Minn. 395, 399–400, 98 N.W.2d 182, 185–
86 (1959) (examining whether a second act superseded a previous act to determine
whether the first act was proximate cause).
223. Sow a d a , 256 Minn. at 399–400, 98 N.W.2d at 185–86.
224. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 2018).
225. As the court notes, Minnesota law on proximate cause simply asks whether
the alleged act is a “substantial factor” in causing the harm. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at
179–180. The substantial factor framework has been criticized for being
misunderstood by courts and was abandoned by the Third Restatement. DAN B. DOBBS,
PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 190 (8th ed. 2017) (quoting John Crane, Inc. v.
Jones, 604 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 2004) (“[T]here is danger that it will be used . . . to describe
a general approach to the legal cause issue.”)); se e a lsoRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT § 29 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST., 2010)
(abandoning the “substantial factor” framework for the purpose of “limiting liability
with greater precision.”). Indeed, the majority’s analysis of proximate cause using the
substantial factor test resolves in a conclusory manner containing no analysis.
Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 180. While procedure does not require an in-depth analysis
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D. A Se c ond Alte rna tive :Duty
1. Dutyvs.Bre a c h
Transactional attorneys seeking to avoid committing malpractice
may wonder whether Wallerich had a “duty” to check her work on the
antenuptial agreement when she drafted the will and before she met
with Frederick in September 2007. Answering this question in the
affirmative would help attorneys understand what tasks are required
of them when they serve return clients. Despite the amicus MSBA’s
urging,226 however, the court did not frame this case as an issue of
duty.
Importantly, the court rejected Frederick’s theory of duty. First,
the court rejected Frederick’s argument that attorneys have a duty to
examine (or reexamine) the facts and research the law each time they
render legal advice to a regular client.227 Though the court briefly
discussed Frederick’s second “duty” theory (the “second attorney”
rule),228 it declined to analyze its merit because the court had already
concluded that Frederick had a separate claim for legal malpractice.229
While the Fre d e ric k decision showed just how easy it is to get
sued for legal malpractice, the court did not explain why lawyers are

by the court at the pleading stage, a better analysis of proximate cause may help limit
liability at this stage without the need for factors.
226. MSBA Brief, supra note 170, at *11 (arguing that a separate duty is a
“prerequisite” to bringing a separate claim).
227. Fre d e ric k, 907 N.W.2d at 177:
[L]awyers must be afforded adequate discretion to make judgment calls
when clients seek to revisit previously completed projects. Lawyers must,
based on context, discern whether the client simply wants reassurance
that the project was completed, a reminder of the outcome, assurance that
the outcome was favorable, or additional legal research on the question
. . . . Frederick’s rule is too broad because it assumes that every client, in
revisiting previous work, prefers the last option: to have the attorney
conduct new research and analysis every time a client asks a question.
228. Id .at 177, n.6:
Frederick also proposes that we adopt a ‘second lawyer’ rule. Frederick
argues that if he had retained a different lawyer for his will drafting, the
second lawyer would be subject to a malpractice claim for failing to
inform him that the antenuptial agreement was invalid, and therefore,
Wallerich, too, is automatically subject to malpractice liability.
229. Id .(“Because we conclude that Frederick has sufficiently alleged a claim for
legal malpractice against Wallerich, it is unnecessary to analyze the merits of this
proposal.”).
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easily exposed to such suits. To clarify the law, the court should have
explained that whether Wallerich reviewed her prior work for validity
was not a question of duty, but of breach, an issue of fact usually
decided at trial.230
The duty element of legal malpractice is satisfied if there is an
attorney-client relationship.231 The Fre d e ric k court determined that
Wallerich and Frederick had an attorney-client relationship in
2007.232 Thus, Wallerich owed Frederick a duty to exercise the
standard of care of a reasonable attorney under the same or similar
circumstances.
The “duty” test under the attorney-client relationship relieves
attorneys of liability to nonclients233 for purely economic losses.234
The test does not determine whether and when attorneys incur
spe c ific duties, such as the duty to review prior work—rarely does tort
law impose duties to take (or not take) a specific action. Rather, duty
is better characterized as a gateway to liability—a relationship or a
set of circumstances that triggers the possibility of liability, depending
on the alleged tortfeasor’s conduct.235

230. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719 (“While the existence of a duty is a question of
law for the court, a number of courts leave it to the jury to resolve any contested
issues of fact on this issue.”).
231. Id .
232. Fre d e ric k,907 N.W.2d at 173 (“It is undisputed that the facts alleged in this
case satisfy the first element of a legal-malpractice claim, the existence of an attorneyclient relationship. At issue are the remaining elements: whether negligent acts exist
that were the proximate and but-for cause of Frederick’s damages.”).
233. Se e Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYER, supra note 33, § 14 (citing situations where the
attorney-client relationship is often at issue, such as whether an attorney represents
trustees to an estate, employees of a client organization, or an insured person when
the attorney defending a medical malpractice action is hired by the insurance
company).
234. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 718. For physical or emotional harm, everyone owes
everyone else a duty of reasonable care to avoid that harm, but when alleged harm is
purely economic, there must be special circumstances such as a special relationship.
235. Se e Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 294 (1970)
(“Once it has been established that the relationship of attorney and client exists and
that plaintiff has sustained damages by reason of the attorney’s negligence or breach
of contract, the right to recover is established.”). Se e g e ne ra llyDOBBS, supra note 5, §
258.
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In legal malpractice, breach is specific conduct that falls beneath
the standard of care generally owed to the client.236 In this case, the
breach at issue could be either the 2007 drafting of the will or the
alleged assurances that the antenuptial agreement was still valid. To
determine whether an attorney breached a duty owed to a client, one
must examine how a reasonable attorney would have acted under the
same or similar circumstances. 237 This typically involves hiring
experts in the form of other attorneys to testify as to what they would
have done.238
In Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h, Frederick would have had to produce an
expert to testify that he or she would have reviewed the antenuptial
agreement in order to show that Wallerich should have reexamined
the antenuptial agreement before drafting the will. To counter,
Wallerich could have brought in an expert to testify that he or she
would not have reviewed the antenuptial agreement. The jury would
then decide which course of action sounded more reasonable. If the
jury determined Wallerich acted unreasonably, then she was
negligent.239 Luckily for Wallerich, any expert testimony against her
might be countered by the fact that a substantial portion of the local
legal community has expressed support for her course of action.240
2. The “Sc ope ofEng a g e m e nt” Approa c h toDuty
The MSBA argued that Wallerich owed Frederick c e rta in duties
throughout the course of their attorney-client relationship,241 and that
these duties are determined by the scope of the engagement, or the

236. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719.
237. Id .Though the court does not address the merits of Frederick’s “second
attorney” test, Fre d e ric k at 186 n.6, the test should fail because it changes the
circumstances too drastically.
238. Tog sta d , 291 N.W.2d at 692:
John Mcnulty, a Minneapolis attorney, and Charles Hvass testified as
experts on behalf of the defendants . . . . [McNulty] testified, however, that
when a lawyer is asked his legal opinion on the merits of a medical
malpractice claim, community standards require that the attorney check
hospital records and consult with an expert before rending his opinion.
Id .; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719.
239. Importantly, this does not mean she is liable—causation and damages must
still be proven.
240. MSBA Brief, supra note 170, AAML Brief, supra note 171, PLDF Brief, supra
note 172.
241. MSBA Brief, supra note 170, at *11.
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specific duties outlined in the retainer agreement between the
parties.242 This approach is consistent with fundamental principles of
contract law: people may agree to organize their relationships with
one another to make them more predictable, thereby encouraging
business transactions and projects involving multiple independent
parties.243 With this approach, parties may incur and impose duties to
take or not take particular actions, standing in contrast to the general
duty of care imposed by tort law, which may require or prohibit
actions depending on the circumstances. Nevertheless, such an
approach would not likely cause a malpractice claim to be dismissed
on summary judgment because it does not comport with the general
nature of duty in legal malpractice.
Attorneys are generally free to limit the scope of engagement
with a client as long as the client is sufficiently informed.244 A client is
sufficiently informed if the client knows not to rely on the attorney to
take a particular action or be generally responsible for a certain
matter.245 With this knowledge, the client may take steps to address
that matter personally or with another professional. Here, had
Frederick known that Wallerich never planned to meaningfully
review the antenuptial agreement, he could have specifically asked
her, or another attorney, to do so. Conversely, if Wallerich had
specifically disclaimed this task in writing, Frederick could not
effectively argue that he reasonably believed she would review the
antenuptial agreement in a meaningful way.246
One limitation on the scope-of-engagement approach is that the
two parties, attorney and client, are on unequal footing as contracting
parties. Because the client is not trained in the law, the client may not
242. Id .
243. Subha Narasimhan, Re la tionship or Bound a ry? H a nd ling Suc c e ssive
Contra c ts, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1077, 1101 (1989) (“Parties are better left to their own
device . . . parties will devise strategies of cooperation, bonding, and reputational
constraints on their own in order to minimize opportunism.”).
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 33, at § 19;
se e STEPHANIE L. KIMBRO, UNBUNDLED LEGAL SERVICEs - RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICE GUIDE OF
LAWYERS MUTUAL, 5 (2016), https://lawyersmutualnc.com/hifi/files/riskmanagement-resources/risk-management-handouts/avoiding-malpracticetraps/Unbundling_Legal_Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRJ6-BSUG] (discussing
best practices for offering limited-scope legal assistance to pro-se litigants).
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 33, at § 19.
246. Se e infra Part IV.D.3.

1082

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:3

understand portions of the retainer agreement or know exactly what
to expect based on its terms.247 Moreover, the client’s reasonable
interpretation of the contract will control in court.248 Therefore, a
scope-of-engagement agreement is only as good as the client’s
reasonable interpretation of it. Applying the facts of the case,
Frederick would allege that based on their agreement, he reasonably
expected Wallerich to meaningfully review the antenuptial agreement
in 2007. To determine whether this was reasonable, a lay jury would
decide whether they, too, would have expected Wallerich to
meaningfully review the agreement based on their own interpretation
of the agreement.
3. The “Fre d e ric k Le tte r”
Transactional attorneys, their firms, and their insurance
companies may be wise to draft a customizable “Frederick Letter,” or
a type of continuing engagement letter for returning clients. Such a
letter would aim to clarify expectations and avoid misunderstandings
between attorney and client, ultimately reducing malpractice
exposure. The letter would make clear which issues or attorney work
products were revisited in a meaningful way and which ones were left
alone. The letter could explain that the attorney stands by their prior
work and proceeds as if it is valid, but because the law is subject to
change, the attorney makes no claim as to its current validity unless
the client and attorney expressly agree that the attorney should
revisit the matter. The letter may invite the client to request a
reevaluation.
A “Frederick Letter” would probably have the effect of reducing
the number of malpractice suits filed because it would improve
attorney-client communication.249 But it would not likely get a
malpractice action dismissed in the event a client sues anyway. In
contrast to the “Togstad Letter,” or non-engagement letter,
disclaiming certain tasks does not negate an element of malpractice.

247. Id .
248. ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 10 (citing cases);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 33, at § 18(2) cmt. c (“A
tribunal should construe a contract between client and lawyer as a reasonable person
in the circumstances of the client would have construed it.”); Id .§ 31 cmt. h (“[T]he
client’s reasonable understanding of the scope of the representation controls.”).
249. ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 2 (“Approximately
75% of all grievances filed against lawyers are the result of poor communication.”).
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A non-engagement letter negates an attorney-client relationship,250
the existence of which fully satisfies the duty element of legal
malpractice.251 A non-engagement letter, therefore, would likely help
a defendant attorney convince a court to dismiss a malpractice suit. A
“Frederick Letter,” on the other hand, cannot negate the relationship;
it merely provides evidence of what specific tasks the attorney
undertook to perform and what the client reasonably understood.
Because a client’s reasonable understanding is a fact issue for a jury,
unless reasonable minds could not differ,252 a malpractice case will
likely proceed to trial despite the existence of a “Frederick Letter.”
Nevertheless, client communication is always prudent. Setting
clear expectations and fostering mutual understanding is good client
service.253
Furthermore,
ethical
rules
require
client
254
communication. And of course, it may help avoid a lawsuit before it
is filed. If the client understands the scope of an attorney’s
undertaking, that client will be less likely to sue on the basis of an
action the client knows to be outside of the scope. Furthermore,
should a malpractice case proceed to trial, the Frederick Letter may
help an attorney escape liability.

250. Se e , e .g ., Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F. Supp. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding
that an attorney-client relationship did not exist, based solely on two written
documents communicating to the client that the firm was awaiting authorization).
251. Se e , e .g ., Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 294
(1970) (“Once it has been established that the relationship of attorney and client
exists and that plaintiff has sustained damages by reason of the attorney’s negligence
or breach of contract, the right to recover is established.”); DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719
(“[W]ithout a client-lawyer relationship, there is rarely a duty, and without a duty,
there can be no malpractice liability.”).
252. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 719.
253. Cf.ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS TOOLKIT, supra note 16, at 15 (“[T]he Disengagement letter provides an opportunity to enhance client relations. Use this final
opportunity to express gratitude for the client’s business. If a favorable outcome was
achieved, briefly remind the client of this fact. If desired, enclose a survey to evaluate
and help enhance the quality of service provided by the firm.”); A.B.A., supra note 37
(quoting attorney Laurence J. Fox) (“[T]he engagement letter and two types of
disengagement letters . . . are ‘critical . . .’ for ‘creating the right atmosphere for a good
lawyer-client relationship.’”).
254. MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4 (discussing professional responsibilities
pertaining to communication with clients).
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E. Re c om m e nd a tions
In addition to non-engagement and initial engagement letters,
transactional attorneys serving return clients should send their
clients letters on an ongoing basis specifying what tasks have been
performed and clarifying that no other work was requested or
performed. The letter could also state: “[Attorney and/or law firm]
makes no guarantee as to the continuing validity of attorney-drafted
documents or previously provided legal advice. If you have concerns
about a legal issue [I and/or the firm] has worked on in the past, [I
and/or the firm] would be happy to revisit the issue upon request.
Additional fees may be charged to fulfill such a request.” For
evidentiary purposes, this communication should be in writing, and
attorneys and their firms should keep a copy of the letter on file.
Attorneys should be aware that any oral or written reassurance
regarding prior work may constitute legal advice, and of course, that
legal advice given negligently constitutes malpractice. Transactional
attorneys should be concerned about this issue in any interaction with
returning clients, but especially when assets associated with a prior
transaction are subject to appreciation and when the two legal
projects both relate, even if independently, to those assets.255 Further,
attorneys should avoid cross-referencing documents unless
absolutely necessary to comply with the law or the client’s intent, in
order to avoid an interpretation that damages resulting from one
defective document are related to another.256
V.

CONCLUSION

Fre d e ric k v.W a lle ric h addressed the issue of whether and when
a client can allege multiple acts of legal malpractice for purposes of
separate claims with separately-accruing statutes of limitation.257 The
court ruled that Frederick’s two claims were sufficiently separate
because (1) the second act “significantly worsened” Frederick’s
position, (2) the two acts were of “different types,” (3) the two acts
occurred at different times and during different transactions, (4) the
second act did not flow causally from the first, and (5) the second act
relied explicitly on the prior work.258 In doing so, the court let more

255. Se e discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a.
256. Se e discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b.
257. Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 174 (2018).
258. Id .at 174–75.
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malpractice claims through the door to the jury without providing
clear guidance as to how transactional attorneys should seek to avoid
this result.
Courts and attorneys confronted with the multi-factor
framework will likely encounter difficulty with its application and its
reasoning. To avoid malpractice exposure, attorneys and law firms
are advised to ramp up client communication to clarify expectations.
Attorneys must also be wary of assurances and cross references when
serving returning clients.
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